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A game-theoretic dynamical model of social preference and enlightened self-interest is formulated.
Existence of symmetry and duality in the game matrices with altruistic social preference is revealed.
The model quantitatively describes the dynamical evolution of altruism in prisoner’s dilemma and
the regime change in prey-predator dynamics.
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Through the modeling of ecosystems, evolutionary
game theory brings such diverse fields as biology, ecology,
economics and sociology under the umbrella of mathe-
matical sciences [1, 2, 3]. One central objective of evo-
lutionary game theory is to understand the workings of
cooperative behavior among the individuals in an ecosys-
tem. Since the publication of the work by Axelrot on the
prisoner’s dilemma [4], it is generally understood that the
concept of altruism holds a key to the emergence of coop-
erative behavior. While egoism, defined as the drive to-
ward maximization of individual payoffs, is a cornerstone
of game theory, casual observation reveals that altruism
is just as universal a feature as egoism in systems con-
sisting of like individuals. Altruism has obtained mathe-
matical expression in the work of Bester and Gu¨th [5], in
which altruistic behavior is shown to become evolutionar-
ily stable in certain situations through the enhancement
of fitness of a majority of individuals in a system. While
their mathematical treatment is general and elegant, it is
formulated in static and descriptive language. Bringing
in dynamics to the model would give it more predictive
power.
In this article, we do not try to explain the emergence
of altruistic cooperation. Rather, we intend to develop
a game-theoretic model of ecosystem whose evolution is
driven by the development of an optimal degree of al-
truism. Toward this goal, the separation of two time
scales, one for the fast variation of dynamical variables,
and the other for the secular variation of “environmen-
tal” coefficients, proves to be crucial [7]. The formulation
of our model in terms of parametric game matrices re-
veals symmetry properties of altruistic game theory. We
demonstrate the usefulness of our approach through nu-
merical analyses of a game of prisoner’s dilemma and a
prey-predator system. In the latter example, we point
out the existence of a regime change phenomenon caused
by dynamical symmetry breaking.
We start by considering a system of N identical indi-
viduals randomly paired to repeatedly play a two-player
game withM+1 pure strategies. We introduce the payoff
∗E-mail:taksu.cheon@kochi-tech.ac.jp;
http://www.mech.kochi-tech.ac.jp/cheon/
matrix A and the system average strategy vector x,
A = {Aij} (i, j = 0, ...,M), (1)
x = {xi} (i = 0, ...,M).
All entries in A and x are real numbers, and the relation
x0 = 1 − x1 − ... − xM is imposed. It is convenient to
consider x as column vector so that the matrix product
Ax is again a column vector. We index the elements of
A such that a player with i-th strategy playing against
another player with j-th strategy will obtain the payoff
Ai,j . We interpret x either as the system being made
up of xiN players playing i-th strategy, or alternatively
as N individuals adopting identical mixed strategies in
which the probability of playing i-th strategy is given by
xi. A player with a mixed strategy specified by a vector
s in the system obtains the payoff
〈s|A|x〉 = s†Ax = s†p(A,x). (2)
In the second equality, the payoff vector is defined as
p(A,x)≡Ax, whose i-th element represents the payoff of
a player with i-th pure strategy. We can average 〈s|A|x〉
over the entire system by the identification s = x, and
obtain the average per capita payoff of the system Π(x) ≡
〈x|A|x〉. In spite of the use of bra-ket notations 〈s| and
|x〉, an obvious adoption from the quantum mechanics,
all entries to the vectors are real numbers representing
probabilities, and there should be no confusion on the
fact that we are dealing with classical game theory.
As is well known, the best strategy for a game among
players seeking immediate individual payoff maximiza-
tion is given by the mixed Nash equilibrium [6] of the
matrix A. This equilibrium, however, does not always
give maximization of the system average payoff. A sys-
tem consisting of players with longer view on their payoff
often has a higher average payoff than a Hobbsian system
consisting of narrowly egoistic players. To describe such
“enlightened self-interest”, we follow Bester and Gu¨th
[5], and separate the process of reproduction from that
of selection: The players switch strategies in pursuit of
the maximization of a range of perceived payoffs which
are related, but not necessarily identical to the real pay-
off. The deviation of perceived from real payoffs could
represent imperfect information, socially imposed norm,
or just error and caprice. The system is then assumed to
2be under slow selection process during which the players
with inferior (real) payoff are pruned off. To formulate
such two-stage evolution in a simple manner, we define
a one-parameter family of matrix Aκ, which we call the
game matrix with the preference parameter κ. We as-
sume that Aκ reduces to the original payoff matrix A
with κ = 0. The specific example we study is the game
matrix
Aκ ≡ (1 − κ)A+ κA†, κ ∈ [0, 1], (3)
where A† is the transposed matrix of A defined by
A† = {A†ij} (i, j = 0, ...,M); A
†
ij ≡ Aji. (4)
Notice that, in all instances in this article, superscript κ
on game matrix A and strategy vector x signify the pref-
erence parameter, not the exponentiation. Be prepared
to see the notations A0 = A, A1 = A† etc.. The meaning
of A† becomes evident by considering its payoff vector
p(A†,x) = A†x, whose i-th component is the average
payoff yielded to the opponent by a player with the pure
strategy i. Therefore, we call A† the altruistic dual ma-
trix of the original payoff matrix A. Obvously we have
a relation 〈x|A|x〉 =
〈
x|A†|x
〉
, which simply means that
per capita system payoff can be calculated from the pay-
off obtained by players, or from the payoff contributed
by him to the rest of the system. We can generalize this
result for Aκ as Aκ† = A1−κ, namely A1−κ is the altru-
istic dual matrix of Aκ. Per capita system payoff Π(x)
can be calculated from Aκ with any allowed value of κ;
Π(x) = 〈x|Aκ|x〉 , κ ∈ [0, 1]. (5)
Consider a system with a given preference parameter
κ which evolves with replicator dynamics [8], in which
a player with strategy s tinkers with the changes to
the strategy by δs, and accepts the changes in a prob-
ability proportional to the resulting gain in the payoff
〈s+ δs|Aκ|x〉 − 〈s|Aκ|x〉. The time development of strat-
egy xκ is described by theM -dimensional Lotka-Volterra
equation
x˙κi
xκi
= ∂si〈s|A
κ|xκ〉|
s=xκ
(6)
= pi(A
κ,xκ)− p0(A
κ,xκ),
with i = 1, ...,M . We refer to this dynamics as an Aκ-
constrained game, or simply an Aκ-game. Typically, af-
ter some time period, xκ approaches a stable fixed point
Xκ, which we call Aκ-Nash equilibrium, that is obtained
by the linear equation
pi(A
κ,Xκ) = p0(A
κ,Xκ), (i = 1, ...,M). (7)
Suppose we have an ensemble of systems with various val-
ues of preference parameter κ. If there is a selection pro-
cess based on the payoff Π(Xκ) at work, the average pref-
erence parameter κ shall evolve toward κ = κmax that
gives the maximum per capita system payoff Π(Xκmax).
For example, we can postulate
m
κ˙
κ
= ∂κ 〈X
κ|A|Xκ〉 , (8)
where m is a large number m ≫ 1 that ensures slow
secular variation of κ in comparison to the variation of
dynamical variable xκ. We might alternatively consider
the development of κ by Newtonian dynamics, in which
case −Π(Xκ) should be identified as the potential.
Our task is reduced to evaluating the functional profile
of Π(Xκ). Let us note the relation Π(Xκ) = pi(A
κ,Xκ)
for arbitrary i, which is obtained from (5) and (7). Com-
bining this with another equality
pk(A
κ,Xκ) =
∑
i
X1−κi
∑
j
AκijX
κ
j (9)
=
∑
i
Xκi
∑
j
A1−κij X
1−κ
j
= pl(A
1−κ,X1−κ),
which is valid for arbitrary k and l, we obtain the altru-
istic duality
Π(Xκ) = Π(X1−κ). (10)
Namely, the per capita system payoff for an Aκ-game is
exactly equal to that of its dual game A1−κ. Specifi-
cally, we have Π(X0)= Π(X1), an equivalence of payoff
between a completely egoistic game A and a completely
altruistic game A†. We stress that this duality is non-
trivial, unlike, for example, the mere matrix symmetry
(5). One immediate result of (10) is that κ = 1/2 has to
be an extremum of the payoff Π(Xκ). If this is the sole
maximum, we have the inequality
Π(X1/2) > Π(Xκ) > Π(X0). (11)
In general, there could be other extrema and also κ = 1/2
could be a minimum. But we shall show in the follow-
ing examples, that there are indeed interesting cases in
which (11) holds, and that examples include the clas-
sic prisoner’s dilemma. The maximum happiness of the
maximum majority is achieved when every individual in
the system is constrained to pursue an equal mixing of
egoistic and altruistic payoff. In hindsight, this is to be
expected, since direct maximization of the per capita sys-
tem payoff results in symmetrization of the game matrix
A;
∂xi〈x|A|x〉 = ∂si
〈
s|(A+A†)|x
〉∣∣
s=x
= 0. (12)
We illustrate our results with two examples. First,
consider a two-strategy (i = 0, 1) game whose payoffs are
specified by the matrix
A =
(
0 β + α
−γ β
)
, (13)
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FIG. 1: The Aκ-constrained prisoner’s dilemma specified by
the payoff table (13). The parameters are chosen to be α = 4,
β = 1 and γ = 2. In the middle graph, pi stands for pi(A,X
κ).
where α, β and γ are positive real numbers that satisfy
the condition α> γ. This is the famous example of pris-
oner’s dilemma: When two players show a “good hand”,
i = 1, both obtain the payoff of β, but when one player
betrays the other by playing a bad hand, i = 0, he gets
the Devil’s reward of α+β while imposing the damage−γ
on the opponent. When both players show a “bad hand”
there is no payoff. Temporal evolution of Aκ-constrained
game is described by the logistic equation
x˙κ1 = [κ(α+ β + γ)− γ]x
κ
1 − (α− γ)(x
κ
1 )
2. (14)
The evolutionary Nash equilibrium is fixed pointXκ1 with
an average payoff Π(Xκ) given respectively by
Xκ1 = −
γ
α− γ
+
α+ β + γ
α− γ
κ, (15)
Π(Xκ) = −
(α+ β)γ
α− γ
+
(α+ β + γ)2
α− γ
κ(1− κ).
The per capita system payoff Π(Xκ) is indeed reflection-
symmetric with respect to the line κ = 1/2. An inter-
esting quantity to look at is the difference p1(A,X
κ) −
p0(A,X
κ) = −(α+ β + γ)κ. This is the payoff disparity
between good and bad hands, which has to be tolerated
by good-hand players to achieve an Aκ-game with a non-
zero value of κ. The peculiarity of this game is that both
for a purely egoistic game A0 and for a purely altruis-
tic game A1, the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (15)
is located outside of a realizable domain 0 ≤ X1 ≤ 1.
Easy calculation shows that only κ0 ≤ κ ≤ κ1 with
κ0 = γ/(α + β + γ) and κ1 = α/(α + β + γ) is allowed.
These are the values that give Xκ01 = 0 and X
κ1
1 = 1.
If κ = 1/2 falls between them, the system eventually
reaches this optimum state having
X
1/2
1 =
α+ β − γ
2(α− γ)
, Π(X1/2) =
(α+ β − γ)2
4(α− γ)
. (16)
Otherwise, the system settles for Π(Xκ1) = β. Figure
1 depicts an example of the former case. We expect ex-
perimental studies to be performed to check these pre-
dictions. Also, comparison with numerical simulations
with real strategies with memory (such as Tit-for-Tat or
Pavlov) [4, 9, 10, 11] would be beneficial.
As our second example, we consider the following
three-strategy (i = 0, 1, 2) game;
A =

 0 0 0b b− a b − ρ
−d fρ− d −d

 , (17)
where a, b, d, f and ρ are positive real numbers. With
strategy 0, a player abstains. With strategy 1, he/she
produces worth valued at b. Worth is reduced by a when
the opponent also produces worth because of overcrowd-
ing. With strategy 2, the player wastes his/her resources
valued at d. But he/she can derives worth valued at
fρ from the worth-producing opponent by way of raid-
ing and dimininishing the opponent’s worth by ρ. If we
describe the system by three-strategy vector x, a nat-
ural interpretation is that x1 represents the portion of
total population which subsists on environmental riches
(“commoners”), and x2, the portion which tries to dom-
inate the opponents (“knights”). Under the replicator
dynamics with the Aκ-constrained game, the evolution
of the system is governed by
x˙κ1 = (1− κ)bx
κ
1 − a(x
κ
1 )
2 − (1− κ− κf)ρxκ1x
κ
2 (18)
x˙κ2 = −(1− κ)dx
κ
2 + (f − κ− κf)ρx
κ
1x
κ
2 .
This is the classical Lotka-Volterra prey-predator system,
of which the Nash equilibrium is obtained as
Xκ1 =
(1− κ)d
(f − κ− κf)ρ
, (19)
Xκ2 =
(1− κ)
(1 − κ− κf)ρ
[
b−
ad
(f − κ− κf)ρ
]
.
One complication is that, when κ becomes larger than
κ∗ ≡ (f − ad/bρ)/(1 + f), the fixed point Xκ2 falls below
zero and becomes unstable. Concurrently, however, there
appears a new trivial Nash equilibrium, which is given by
Xκ1 =
(1 − κ)b
a
, Xκ2 = 0. (20)
This case corresponds to a single-species logistic evolu-
tion, for which the game matrix is effectively reduced to
Aκ =
(
0 κb
(1− κ)b b− a
)
. (21)
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FIG. 2: The three-strategy game specified by the payoff ma-
trix (17) with Aκ-constrained game dynamics. The parame-
ters are chosen to be a = 1, b = 1, d = 1, f = 0.8 and ρ = 4.
In the middle graph, pi stands for pi(A,X
κ), and p0 is identi-
cally zero. At κ = κ∗, the system displays the transition from
prey-predator dynamics to single spieces logistic dynamics.
In either case, the Aκ-Nash equilibrium yields the per
capita system payoff
Π(Xκ) =
D
T
; (22)
D ≡ det(Aκij), T ≡
∑
i,j
(−1)i+j∆ij(A
κ),
where ∆ij(A
κ) is the minors of Aκ.
An example of this model with specific parameters is
depicted in Figure 2. The Π(Xκ) has a single peak at
κ = 1/2 as before, but because of the change in the na-
ture of dynamics at κ∗, it is no longer symmetric. Sup-
pose we start from a knight-commoner dynamics of κ = 0
game. The system is Pareto optimal in that payoffs for
both commoners and knights are identical. Turning on
non-zero κ amounts to introducing “altruistic culture”.
Curiously, this reduces the population capacity of knights
and, at the same time, increase its payoff. For com-
moners, it results in lager population and lower relative
payoff. Although the overall per capita payoff increases
quickly, the class disparity also increases with knights
commanding ever higher relative payoff as the system
becomes more altruistic. At κ = κ∗ however, the pop-
ulation capacity for knights become zero and the “aris-
tocratic” regime collapses. Above κ∗, we have a “demo-
cratic” regime consisting of single self-sustaining popu-
lation of commoners, ever prospering with increasing al-
truism until the system hits the ceiling level at κ = 1/2,
which is the global stability point.
In both of the above two examples, κ = 1/2 turns out
to be the only maximum in the allowed region. But in
general, higher polynomials in (22) for larger M could
result in more structures in the Π(Xκ) profile for higher
numbers of strategies. We should thus expect to find
more complex dynamics.
The indirect payoff maximization through the “com-
munal” arrangement of social goods is widespread among
ecosystems in which components have intellectual capac-
ity. The examples we have studied in this article are
simple toy models which do not necessarily have specific
real-world counterparts. The fact that they show features
reminiscent to concepts devised by the socio-economic
philosophers in past centuries is rather intriguing.
The author wishes to acknowledge his gratitude to
Takuma Yamada, Toshiya Kawai and David Greene for
helpful discussions and useful comments.
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